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A CALL FOR CLARITY RESULTING FROM DAIMLER AG V. BAUMAN: 
JURISDICTIONAL VEIL PIERCING IN THE CONTEXT OF PARENT AND 
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF FRAUD OR 
INJUSTICE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the years since International Shoe v. Washington,1 the tenets of gen-
eral personal jurisdiction have become somewhat mythical and surprisingly 
difficult to comprehend.2 Likewise, although some consider it one of the 
most litigated concepts in corporate law,3 courts are hesitant to allow a 
plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil4 to obtain jurisdiction over a parent 
company.5 In January 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States squarely 
confronted both of these concepts in Daimler AG v. Bauman.6 In holding 
that Daimler was not subject to general jurisdiction in California, the Court 
rested its reasoning on a number of assumptions.7 Courts should retain these 
assumptions as part of their future jurisdictional veil-piercing analyses. 
Daimler’s impact is two-fold. First, corporations are no longer likely to 
be subject to general jurisdiction in fora other than their state(s) of incorpo-
ration and principle place of business.8 Formerly, the post-Goodyear9 con-
sensus was that corporations would be subject to general jurisdiction in any 
 
 1. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 2. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 628, 630 
(1988). 
 3. John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdic-
tion over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
445, 446 (2004). 
 4. Though corporations are generally not liable for the actions or debts of their subsidi-
aries, “‘[p]iercing the corporate veil’ refers to the judicially imposed exception to this princi-
ple by which courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a shareholder 
responsible for the corporation’s action as if it were the shareholder’s own.” Robert B. 
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1036 (1991). Throughout this note, the term “traditional veil piercing” is used to refer to the 
situation in which this vicarious liability is asserted. 
 5. Swain & Aguilar, supra note 3. In contrast with traditional veil piercing, this note 
uses the term “jurisdictional veil piercing” to refer to the assertion that a corporate entity is 
subject to jurisdiction in a forum based on the contacts of an affiliated entity. 
 6. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 7. Id. at 760. 
 8. See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 197, 197 (2014) (stating “that general jurisdiction is only available over a corporate 
defendant in the place of its incorporation, the place of its principal place of business, or, ‘in 
an exceptional case,’ in another forum where it is ‘essentially at home’”). 
 9. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
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forum in which that corporation was “essentially at home.”10 Although the 
Court used the exact same language in both Daimler and Goodyear, the 
Daimler opinion stressed how unlikely it is for a corporation to have suffi-
cient contacts to qualify for general jurisdiction in a location other than its 
state(s) of incorporation and principle place of business by noting that such 
an instance would require an “exceptional case.”11 Perhaps more important-
ly, the Court also noted that “[g]eneral jurisdiction . . . calls for an appraisal 
of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.”12 
As Justice Sotomayor was quick to mention in her concurrence, this “pro-
portionality approach” to analyzing an entity’s contacts instills a novel and 
somewhat unpredictable twist in jurisdictional precedent.13 
Daimler’s second major impact, and the primary focus of this note, oc-
curs in the process of piercing the corporate veil for the purpose of obtaining 
jurisdiction over a parent corporation. The Court prefaced its reasoning with 
the assumption that the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC 
(MBUSA), Daimler’s wholly-owned subsidiary, could be attributed to 
Daimler for the purpose of assessing general jurisdiction over Daimler in 
California.14 By making this assumption, the Court was able to decide the 
case on jurisdictional grounds15 and avoid dealing with an issue that has 
troubled courts for years—jurisdictional veil piercing. In so doing, the form 
of the Court’s reasoning provides a new framework for the analysis of this 
troubling issue that, if followed by lower courts, will significantly clarify the 
law and introduce some consistency into an otherwise unpredictable doc-
trine. 
This note first presents the necessary background pertaining to the evo-
lution of corporate entities and limited liability16 before briefly considering 
the origins and progression of personal jurisdiction.17 The discussion then 
 
 10. Id. at 2851. See also Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 551 (2012) 
(suggesting corporations may be subject to general jurisdiction in “places where they engage 
in such substantial, continuous, and systematic activity that those places are comparable to 
principal places of business”). 
 11. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19. 
 12. Id. at 762 n.20. 
 13. Id. at 770–71 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“If anything, the majority’s approach 
injects an additional layer of uncertainty because a corporate defendant must now try to fore-
tell a court’s analysis as to both the sufficiency of its contacts with the forum State itself, as 
well as the relative sufficiency of those contacts in light of the company’s operations else-
where. Moreover, the majority does not even try to explain just how extensive the company’s 
in-state contacts must be in the context of its global operations in order for general jurisdic-
tion to be proper.”). 
 14. Id. at 760 (majority opinion). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
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turns to an analysis of the different theories of veil piercing used by courts 
in the past.18 Next, this note examines the rampant confusion surrounding 
veil-piercing doctrine and proposes three things: first, the confusion is more 
form than substance;19 second, lower courts should follow the Daimler 
Court’s lead and invert the traditional steps performed in the jurisdictional 
veil-piercing analyses;20 and third, there is simply no justification for a find-
ing of fraud or injustice when analyzing a parent corporation’s contacts with 
a forum.21 
II. BACKGROUND 
The original corporate model consisted merely of the corporate entity 
and its shareholders.22 Indeed, until 1890, private corporations in the United 
States could not purchase stock or acquire any ownership interests in other 
corporations.23 At this time in the nation’s history, simple tests to assess 
jurisdiction and corporate identity were sufficient given the basic nature of 
the corporate structure.24 Over time, however, as the corporate model has 
become increasingly dynamic and complex,25 the tests by which courts de-
termine whether the corporate form should be disregarded have also become 
more complicated.26 This section first provides basic definitions of limited 
liability and personal jurisdiction, respectively. It then proceeds with a dis-
cussion of jurisdictional veil piercing before ending with the evolution of 
traditional veil piercing. 
A. Definitions of Limited Liability and Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Legal scholars have touted limited liability as “the greatest single dis-
covery of modern times,”27 but, as this statement indicates, limited liability 
 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 20. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 21. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 22. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of 
Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605, 606 (2005). 
 23. In 1890, New Jersey passed the first legislation allowing corporations to purchase 
stock in other corporations. Id. To some, this earned New Jersey the nickname of the “Traitor 
State.” See Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, Part II–How She Sold Out the 
United States, 25 MCCLURE’S MAG. 41, 41 (1905). 
 24. See Blumberg, supra note 22, at 608. 
 25. Id. at 607. 
 26. Id. at 608; see, e.g., Pro Tanks Leasing v. Midwest Propane & Refined Fuels, LLC, 
988 F. Supp. 2d 772, 783–84 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (listing twenty-two factors to be considered to 
determine the relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary). 
 27. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT? STUDIES IN PRACTICAL POLITICS 82 (1912). 
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has not always been the rule.28 In its most basic form, “[t]he rule of limited 
liability means that the investors in the corporation are not liable for more 
than the amount they invest.”29 Another basic proposition that flows logical-
ly from the first is the rule that a corporation and its investors are treated as 
distinct from one another.30 Little by little, limited liability replaced “ancient 
doctrines of personal responsibility,”31 which, at one time, permeated the 
corporate landscape.32 
The current permutation of limited liability has been commonplace in 
the United States for roughly the past 175 years.33 After the Industrial Revo-
lution, at a time when growing businesses were in need of increased capital 
beyond the liquidity of their current investors, limited liability was seen as a 
way of generating investment from third-parties while simultaneously 
shielding these external parties from liability in excess of their contribu-
tions.34 More recently, the principles of limited liability—once exclusively 
granted to corporations—have been extended to other types of business enti-
ties such as limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and limited 
liability partnerships.35 Likewise, parent corporations with subsidiary com-
 
 28. Prior to the widespread acceptance of limited liability, corporate shareholders could 
be held responsible for some outstanding obligations of the corporation in limited circum-
stances through “creditors’ bills” and other statutory creations. See generally Edwin H. Ab-
bot, Jr., Conflict of Laws and the Enforcement of the Statutory Liability of Stockholders in a 
Foreign Corporation, 23 HARV. L. REV. 37 (1909) (describing the then-existing processes 
through which shareholders could be made to shoulder corporate debts). 
 29. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1985); see also David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Fi-
nancial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1309 (2007) 
(“[L]imited liability protects a corporation’s shareholders from personal responsibility for 
corporate obligations.”). Limited liability arose to foster feelings of security among corporate 
investors, thereby encouraging economic growth and increasing the flow of economic capital. 
Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 604 (1986). 
Some commentators even argue that without limited liability, liquid securities markets would 
not be possible. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 92. 
 30. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003) (“A basic tenet of 
American corporate law is that the corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities.”); 
Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (“A corporation and its stockholders are generally 
to be treated as separate entities.”). 
 31. Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate 
Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 875 (2000). 
 32. Blumberg, supra note 22, at 603. Prior to the use of creditors’ bills, a creditor could 
simply file suit against a corporate shareholder personally in an attempt to satisfy an out-
standing debt held by the corporation. Id. 
 33. Id. at 604 (“For more than 150 years in the United States and Continental Europe, 
and for more than 100 years in England, limited liability for shareholders has been the firmly 
established legal principal underlying corporation law.”). 
 34. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization 
Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996). 
 35. Millon, supra note 29, at 1309. 
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panies also enjoy limited liability, and the parent and subsidiary are viewed 
as distinct legal entities.36 
However, this liability, or risk, does not simply vanish; instead, the risk 
is shifted away from the investors and onto others.37 Although this is a fa-
vorable shift for the very reasons that led to the establishment of limited 
liability in the first place, a “creditor has little practical recourse against an 
insolvent corporation.”38 Thus, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 
arose in equity to allow creditors of a corporation to disregard corporate 
formalities in certain situations.39 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction is the power of a court to issue a binding judg-
ment on a defendant.40 The origins of this doctrine rest in Pennoyer v. Neff,41 
in which the Court decided that one must be physically present or own prop-
erty within a jurisdiction to be subject to a court’s jurisdiction therein.42 
Given the explosion of interstate commerce and travel, it is not surprising 
that physical presence is no longer necessary, in many situations, to be sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction.43 However, courts must still comply with 
 
 36. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 26 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2014). 
 37. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 91 (“Limited liability does not elimi-
nate the risk of business failure but rather shifts some of the risk to creditors.”); Robert B. 
Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2003). 
“Creditors” in this context refers both to those individuals or companies who voluntarily 
choose to engage in business with a certain corporate group and those who involuntarily are 
harmed by the actions of a corporation. Thompson, supra, at 1325. The former group—
voluntary creditors—is generally seeking contractual remedies based on an underlying busi-
ness transaction, whereas the latter—involuntary creditors—is more often comprised of tort 
claimants. 
 38. Matheson & Olson, supra note 34, at 8. 
 39. Millon, supra note 29, at 1310. 
 40. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 724. Service of process on the defendant within a forum sufficed to bring that 
defendant within the jurisdiction of a particular court for the purpose of an in personam 
judgment. Id. On the other hand, if a defendant was not served with process in the forum, but 
merely owned property there, the court could proceed in rem and bind the property owner in 
an amount not to exceed the value of the property. Id. As is evident, the hallmark of Pennoyer 
is physical presence—either of the defendant personally or the defendant’s property—within 
a forum. 
 43. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (“As technological progress has 
increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents 
has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and trans-
portation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to 
these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved 
from the rigid rule of [Pennoyer] to the flexible standard of [International Shoe].”). 
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longstanding constitutional due process constraints when exercising jurisdic-
tion.44 
The modern formulation of personal jurisdiction is a product of Inter-
national Shoe v. Washington,45 wherein the Court announced the axiomatic 
“minimum contacts” test.46 This test, though perhaps a thorn in the side of 
many first-year law students,47 is a surprisingly simple concept at its most 
basic level—to be subject to jurisdiction in a forum, a defendant must some-
how act within that forum.48 Framing the test in legal terms, the defendant 
over whom jurisdiction is sought must be within the reach of a state’s long-
arm statute,49 and the exercise of jurisdiction must comply with constitution-
al due process.50 Like many areas of the law, however, the outer edges of 
this test have become increasingly confusing since its inception.51 
C. The Intersection of Limited Liability and Personal Jurisdiction 
Given the confusion surrounding the two above concepts, the nexus be-
tween them is infinitely more so.52 Consider the following illustration and 
hypotheticals to depict the issues in simple terms: Corporation A, incorpo-
rated in Germany, wholly owns Subsidiary B, incorporated in Delaware. If 
B’s sole purpose is to further A’s business in the United States, is A subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Delaware based on the fact that Delaware is B’s 
state of incorporation? If A manufactures widgets in Germany, and B’s only 
 
 44. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011). 
 45. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 46. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (“[D]ue process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”). 
 47. Although none will likely choose Pennoyer over International Shoe. 
 48. See Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No Exit, 47 
AKRON L. REV. 617, 618 (2014) (“At its heart, the law of personal jurisdiction is simple and 
elegant.”). 
 49. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 (1980). 
 50. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–14 (1984). 
 51. Grossi, supra note 48, at 618 (“[D]espite this simple elegance, the United States 
Supreme Court has proven incapable of providing a coherent vision of the law of personal 
jurisdiction.”). 
 52. In 1992, one commentator noted that “[t]he current case law on the topic of jurisdic-
tion over affiliated corporations is disjointed and inexplicit at best.” Daniel G. Brown, Juris-
diction over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated Corporation: Do You 
Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 601 (1992). Unfortunately, 
courts have done very little in the preceding years to clarify the issue. If anything, the prob-
lem may have become even more exacerbated by failed attempts to promote equitable out-
comes; this failure has prompted some to advocate a complete abrogation of veil piercing. 
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 481 (2001). 
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task is to distribute A’s widgets to the United States market, which company 
is liable in tort for damages caused by the widgets? Finally, if both of the 
above factual situations are true, and A incorporated B in Delaware solely to 
shield itself from liability in the United States, does the answer to either 
question change? An examination of the following Supreme Court cases 
shows the manner in which the Court has attempted to answer these ques-
tions. First, this section considers the jurisdictional issue, and the liability 
issues follow. 
1. The Cannon Doctrine: The Origin of Jurisdictional Veil Piercing 
The Supreme Court of the United States’s only direct examination of 
jurisdictional veil piercing came in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy 
Packing Co.53 There, Cannon Manufacturing Company (“Cannon”), which 
was incorporated in North Carolina, brought a breach of contract action in 
North Carolina state court against Cudahy Packing Company (“Cudahy”), 
which was incorporated in Maine.54 After successfully removing the action 
to the Federal Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Cudahy 
entered a special appearance to contest the court’s exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over it.55 Cudahy argued that there was insufficient service of pro-
cess and it was not “doing business”56 in North Carolina sufficient to support 
jurisdiction.57 To initiate the suit, Cannon served process on Frank Ross, 
who was Cudahy Company of Alabama’s (“Cudahy-Alabama”) registered 
agent in that state.58 The district court dismissed the action and Cannon ap-
pealed.59 
At issue on appeal was “whether, at the time of the service of process, 
defendant was doing business within the state in such a manner and to such 
an extent as to warrant the inference that it was present there.”60 In support 
of its argument that jurisdiction was proper, Cannon unsuccessfully attempt-
 
 53. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). 
 54. Id. at 334. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Then-Judge Cardozo’s oft-cited remark from Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. epit-
omized the basis of “doing business” jurisdiction which was controlling in the pre-
International Shoe years where presence was a prerequisite for personal jurisdiction. See 
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917) (“We are to say, not whether the 
business is such that the corporation may be prevented from being here, but whether its busi-
ness is such that it is here. If in fact it is here, if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but 
with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then, whether its business is interstate or 
local, it is within the jurisdiction of our courts.”). 
 57. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 334. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 334–35. 
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ed to persuade the Court that the North Carolina actions of Cudahy-Alabama 
could, by virtue of its relationship with Cudahy, be imputed to the latter 
company sufficiently to show Cudahy’s physical presence in North Caroli-
na.61 
Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that “[t]he corporate separa-
tion, though perhaps merely formal, was real.”62 Cudahy-Alabama was 
simply the instrumentality through which Cudahy chose to distribute its 
products in North Carolina according to the Court.63 Although, as its wholly 
owned subsidiary, Cudahy completely dominated and controlled Cudahy-
Alabama both financially and commercially, and likely established the sub-
sidiary “solely to secure . . . some advantage under the local laws,” “[t]he 
existence of the Alabama company as a distinct corporate entity [was] . . . in 
all respects observed.”64 Thus, jurisdiction was improper because Cudahy 
had no physical presence in North Carolina.65 
Cannon’s legacy is exemplified by the modern approaches to jurisdic-
tional veil piercing.66 For example, in 1993, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, in Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V.,67 
opined that Maryland “has adopted the so-called ‘agency’ test in deciding 
whether to pierce the veil separating parent corporations from their subsidi-
aries for jurisdictional purposes.”68 According to that court, this “agency” 
test is a direct descendent of Cannon, and the central inquiry is determining 
 
 61. Id. at 335. 
 62. Id. at 337. The Court also was careful to distinguish the case at bar from its earlier 
considerations of piercing the corporate veil to impose liability on a parent company. See id. 
(“There is here no attempt to hold the defendant liable for an act or omission of its subsidiary 
or to enforce as against the latter a liability of the defendant . . . . Hence, cases concerning 
substantive rights . . . have no application.”). 
 63. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 338. Although Cannon’s “physical presence” requirement obviously pre-dates 
International Shoe, which casts some doubt on its jurisdictional underpinnings, the doctrine 
descending from it that adheres to “the proposition that, as long as a parent and subsidiary 
maintain separate and distinct corporate entities, the presence of one in the forum state may 
not be considered in determining jurisdiction over the other,” is arguably still sound. See 
Swain & Aguilar, supra note 3, at 455; see also Pro Tanks Leasing v. Midwest Propane & 
Refined Fuels, LLC, 988 F. Supp. 2d 772, 779 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (discussing the impact of 
modern minimum contacts on doing business jurisdiction). 
 66. For more discussion on these approaches, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 67. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 68. Id. at 61. Although an exact count is difficult because many jurisdictions apply both 
the agency and alter-ego approaches, the agency test is performed in at least five other juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1273 (11th 
Cir. 2002); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. 
Co., 136 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 1998); Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 466 
(1st Cir. 1990). 
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how much control a parent corporation exerts over its subsidiary.69 Like-
wise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hargrave 
v. Fibreboard Corp.,70 noted that the “alter-ego” approach is a product of 
Cannon.71 After concluding that the parent corporation had not exercised the 
requisite degree of control over its subsidiary to subject the parent to alter-
ego jurisdiction, the court dismissed the parent from the suit, noting “[t]he 
Lone Star of Texas may shine brightly throughout the world, but its long 
arm is not judicially all encompassing.”72 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed, albeit briefly, both 
of these tests in Daimler—a case that, in the concise words of Justice Gins-
burg, “concern[ed] the authority of a court in the United States to entertain a 
claim brought by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on 
events occurring entirely outside the United States.”73 There, a number of 
Argentinian residents brought suit against DaimlerChrysler 
Aktiengesellschaft (“Daimler”), the German manufacturer of Mercedez-
Benz automobiles.74 The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California seeking to hold Daim-
ler vicariously responsible for the acts75 of Mercedes-Benz Argentina (“MB 
Argentina”), one of Daimler’s subsidiaries.76 
 
 69. See Mylan Labs., Inc., 2 F.3d at 61 (“Originally advanced by Justice Brandeis in 
Cannon . . . , this test allows a court to attribute the actions of a subsidiary corporation to the 
foreign parent corporation only if the parent exerts considerable control over the activities of 
the subsidiary.”). In making this determination, Maryland courts are guided by the following 
factors: whether the parent must approve significant decisions made by the subsidiary; 
whether the two companies keep separate books and/or records; whether the subsidiary has 
some purpose for its existence independent from serving the parent; and whether the parent 
had actual or constructive knowledge that its actions would have impact in Maryland. Id. at 
61–62. 
 70. Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 71. Id. at 1160. The Fifth Circuit is joined by at least six other jurisdictions in applying 
the alter-ego jurisdictional veil-piercing test. See Estate of Thomson ex rel. Estate of 
Rakestraw v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008); Epps v. 
Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 649 (8th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 
915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001); T & N v. Pa. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 44 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 1994); 
I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund, Benefit Plan A v. Wakefield Indus., Div. of Capehart Corp., 699 
F.2d 1254, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th 
Cir. 1974). 
 72. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160. 
 73. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750 (2014). 
 74. Id. 
 75. The plaintiffs alleged that during Argentina’s “Dirty War,” the name given to the 
Argentinian military dictatorship in existence from 1976 to 1983, MB Argentina conspired 
with Argentinian government security “to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and their 
relatives.” Id. at 751. 
 76. Id. at 751–52. 
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Daimler moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.77 In response, the plaintiffs asserted Daimler itself had a physical pres-
ence in California or, in the alternative, the California contacts of another 
one of Daimler’s indirect78 subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), 
could be attributed to Daimler for the purpose of establishing personal juris-
diction over the parent.79 MBUSA is a Delaware limited liability corporation 
with its principal place of business in New Jersey, and it is Daimler’s sole 
domestic importer and distributor of Mercedes-Benz vehicles.80 The plain-
tiffs predicated their vicarious jurisdiction assertion on MBUSA’s contacts 
in California, which included at least three different offices located through-
out the state.81 The district court granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss,82 but 
the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed holding that Daimler was subject to 
personal jurisdiction in California under the agency jurisdictional test.83 
The Ninth Circuit’s fractured decisions in the line of cases84 directly 
leading to Daimler are instructive on the confusion abounding between the 
agency and alter-ego approaches. In its first opinion, the court expressly 
stated, contrary to a number of district court misinterpretations85 of its prec-
edent, the exertion of control by a parent over its subsidiary is a necessary 
finding when applying the agency test.86 Specifically, according to the court, 
a two-step inquiry must be performed: 
First, the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that 
the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the par-
ent, notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities. Control 
must be over and above that to be expected as an incident of ownership. 
Second, the agent-subsidiary must also be sufficiently important to the 
 
 77. Id. at 752. 
 78. MBUSA was actually wholly owned by another of Daimler’s subsidiaries, Daim-
lerChrysler North America Holding Corporation. Id. at 752 n.3. 
 79. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. Importantly to the Court, MBUSA’s activity in California only accounted for 
2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide business. Id. However, Justice Sotomayor noted this 2.4% 
made Daimler $4.6 billion in 2004. Id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 82. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *9–
10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 83. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Bauman II), 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 84. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Bauman I), 579 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009), 
reh’g granted and opinion vacated, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010); Bauman II, 644 F.3d at 
920, rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. 746. 
 85. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1134 (D. 
Nev. 2009); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d 686, 694 
(W.D. Wash. 2003); Synopsys, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., 343 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (N.D. Cal. 2003); 
Modesto City Sch. v. Riso Kagaku Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2001). 
 86. Bauman I, 579 F.3d at 1095. 
2016] JURISDICTIONAL VEIL PIERCING 255 
parent corporation that if it did not have a representative, the parent cor-
poration would undertake to perform substantially similar services.
87
 
Although the first part of this test aligns with other circuits,88 the se-
cond part—the part with which the Supreme Court ultimately took issue89—
is a novel concept. After granting the appellants’ petition for rehearing,90 the 
court then conflated its own aforementioned rule by examining the “suffi-
ciently important” prong first.91 Holding this prong satisfied, the court then 
compared the degree of control required by the agency approach to that re-
quired by the alter-ego analysis and noted that the agency “test requires the 
plaintiffs to show an element of control, albeit not as much control as is re-
quired to satisfy the ‘alter ego’ test.”92 In the following two and a half pages, 
the court minced words to refute the defendant’s argument that the right to 
control, as opposed to actually exercising control, was an insufficient basis 
upon which to satisfy the second prong of this test.93 Unlike the agency test, 
the court noted, not only does the alter-ego approach demand a greater 
showing of control by the parent over the subsidiary, but it also requires a 
showing of fraud or some other injustice.94 In this respect, the Ninth Circuit 
was attempting to contrast its version of the agency test and the traditional 
formulation of piercing the corporate veil. 
The Supreme Court emphatically reversed the Ninth Circuit and held 
that “[e]xercises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant . . . are barred by due 
process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory authority.”95 Although 
the Court noted that it “need not pass judgment on invocation of an agency 
theory in the context of general jurisdiction,” it continued on to discuss the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional veil-piercing theories, which, for the most part, 
parallel the tests performed in other jurisdictions.96 Rather than performing 
the alter-ego test, in support of which Daimler argued, the Court noted that 
“[t]he Ninth Circuit adopted a less rigorous test based on what it described 
as an ‘agency’ relationship.”97 Chiding the use of a test that “always yield[s] 
a pro-jurisdiction answer,” the Court concluded its discussion by noting that 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. As a somewhat ironic twist, the court also noted that the Fifth Circuit “conflate[ed] 
agency and alter ego jurisdiction” in Hargrave. See id. at 1096. 
 89. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 759. 
 90. Bauman I, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 91. See Bauman II, 644 F.3d 909, 920–22 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG, 
134 S. Ct. 746. 
 92. Id. at 920. 
 93. Id. at 922–24. 
 94. Id. at 920. 
 95. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 96. Id. at 759. 
 97. Id. 
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“[t]he Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus appears to subject foreign corpora-
tions to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or 
affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of 
general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”98 
2. The Evolution of Traditional Veil-Piercing Doctrine 
As addressed later in this note, the similarities between jurisdictional 
and traditional veil-piercing doctrines are a primary source of the confusion 
that surrounds veil-piercing jurisprudence as a whole.99 Thus, to present a 
fuller picture of the issues, this section briefly traces the evolution of the 
traditional formulation of piercing the corporate veil, which first arose to 
allow a creditor to seek satisfaction of a corporate obligation from an indi-
vidual or entity that otherwise would be protected by the principles of lim-
ited liability.100 The following cases provide examples of the Court’s treat-
ment of this issue over the years. 
Although courts had been considering limited liability and the abroga-
tion thereof for many years prior, current jurisprudence on piercing the cor-
porate veil picked up steam around the time of the Great Depression.101 For 
example, consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Chicago, Milwaukee, 
and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Association.102 
There, the Court pierced the veil after finding that one company was “a 
mere agency or instrumentality for doing [another company’s] bidding.”103 
In Chicago, the Court was confronted with a situation in which the 
Eastern Company (“Eastern”) and the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies 
(“Milwaukee/Omaha”) were allegedly overcharging for certain carrier tax-
es.104 The Court examined the contractual relationship between the compa-
 
 98. Id. at 759–60 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. 
Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)). 
 99. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 100. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 101. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORP. VEIL § 1:3 (2014). Presser indicates that 
the cases in which courts actually pierced the veil were “few and far between” prior to this 
time, likely because corporations were seen in a more favorable light in the prosperous, pre-
Depression years. Id. 
 102. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass’n, 247 
U.S. 490 (1918). 
 103. Id. at 497. This language led to the development of another veil-piercing approach 
called the “mere instrumentality” test which is largely synonymous with the “alter-ego” theo-
ry. See FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 41.10 (“Under the alter ego doctrine, when a corpora-
tion is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person, the 
corporate form may be disregarded.”). 
 104. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 247 U.S. at 493–94. In essence, the plaintiff 
was alleging that each company was collecting a carrier tax even though the two companies 
were one in the same. Id. 
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nies and rejected Eastern’s claim that it was a separate and distinct entity 
from Milwaukee/Omaha because, by contract, Eastern effectively surren-
dered “all freedom of corporate action.”105 The Court first clarified some of 
its earlier decisions106 by affirming that ownership of another company’s 
stock will not, in and of itself, “create an identity of corporate interest be-
tween the two companies, or render the stockholding company the owner of 
the property of the other, or create the relation of principal and agent or rep-
resentative between the two.”107 However, the Court then distinguished the 
facts at bar from these earlier decisions, noting that this principle had been 
“repeatedly held not applicable” when one company purchased another’s 
stock “for the purpose . . . of controlling a subsidiary company so that it may 
be used as a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning company or 
companies.”108 When “justice . . . may require,” the Court insisted it would 
not “be blinded or deceived by mere forms or law but, regardless of fictions, 
will deal with the substance of the transaction involved as if the corporate 
agency did not exist.”109 
The Court’s next representative110 decision came twenty-six years later 
in Anderson v. Abbott.111 This case concerned the 1929 incorporation of 
Banco Kentucky Company (“Banco”) by National Bank of Kentucky (“Na-
tional”) and Louisville Trust Company (“Louisville”).112 The same directors 
and officers operated all three companies, and Banco traded a majority of its 
corporate stock to National and Louisville in exchange for a majority of 
their stock.113 Thereafter, Banco began purchasing or trading for stock in a 
number of other local and national entities, most of which were banks.114 In 
November 1930, about a year later, National and Louisville both failed, and 
 
 105. Id. at 497. Under this contract, Eastern surrendered to Milwaukee/Omaha all power 
to issue and transfer stock, be financially independent, operate its own track, make its own 
operating decisions, and conduct business with other carriers. Id. 
 106. See United States v. Del., Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 516 (1915); Inter-
state Commerce Comm’n v. Stickney, 215 U.S. 98 (1909); U.S. ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Del. 
& Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909); Peterson v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. R.R. Co., 205 
U.S. 364 (1907); Pullman’s Palace-Car Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 U.S. 587 (1885). 
 107. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 247 U.S. at 500. 
 108. Id. at 501; see also Del., Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 516; United States v. 
Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 257 (1911). 
 109. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 247 U.S. at 501. 
 110. See PRESSER, supra note 101, at § 3:2 (noting that the broad language of Anderson 
has been frequently cited in support of “veil-piercing in situations where there has been no 
fraud, to support the use of undercapitalization as a ground for ignoring limited liability, and 
to support the articulation of federal veil-piercing standards less rigorous than those of state 
law”). 
 111. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944). 
 112. Id. at 352. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 352–53. 
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receivers were appointed to salvage what assets they could.115 National’s 
receiver, Anderson, proceeded against Banco and successfully obtained a 
judgment,116 from which he only recovered $90,000 from the corporation.117 
Anderson then brought the present suit against Banco’s individual stock-
holders under a statutory provision providing for double liability of share-
holders in banking institutions118 to satisfy the remaining balance on the 
judgment.119 The Court also left undisturbed, for lack of clear error, the low-
er courts’ findings that National and Louisville had organized Banco in good 
faith lacking any fraudulent intent.120 
Echoing its earlier language about not being “blinded or deceived by 
mere forms of law,” the Court looked to the substance of Banco’s dealings 
and held that the shareholders were individually liable for the balance of 
Anderson’s judgment.121 Although the Court ultimately assessed liability 
against the shareholders on a statutory basis, Justice Douglas spoke briefly 
about limited liability noting that it “is the rule not the exception[,] and on 
that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, 
and huge sums of capital attracted.”122 Furthermore, “[t]he fact that incorpo-
ration was desired in order to obtain limited liability does not defeat that 
purpose.”123 However, the Court then noted that this rule will not stand when 
abrogating limited liability “is so ‘essential to the end that some accepted 
public policy may be defended or upheld.’”124 According to Justice Douglas, 
 
 115. Id. at 354. 
 116. See Laurent v. Anderson, 70 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1934) (including the unsuccessful 
appeal of the district court’s judgment against Banco). 
 117. Anderson, 321 U.S. at 354. 
 118. This statutory provision, 12 U.S.C. § 64, provided the following before it was re-
pealed in 1959: “The stockholders of every national banking association shall be held indi-
vidually responsible for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, each to the 
amount of his stock therein, at the par value thereof in addition to the amount invested in 
such stock.” See Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 161 (1935). Thus, even without piercing the 
corporate veil, there was statutory liability for bank investors individually. 
 119. Anderson, 321 U.S. at 354. 
 120. Id. at 356. 
 121. Id. at 363 (citing Chi., Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & 
Commerce Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918)). 
 122. Id. at 362. 
 123. Id. at 361. 
 124. Id. at 362 (citing Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)). 
Berkey is perhaps the single most cited case on the topic of piercing the corporate veil. See 
David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How 
Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibil-
ity and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 444 
(1998). Therein, Judge Cardozo noted that “[t]he whole problem of the relation between 
parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.” 
Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61. 
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these public policy concerns include fraud,125 grossly disproportionate oper-
ating capital relative to the nature of the business, and subrogation of legis-
lative policy.126 
The final Supreme Court decision this note considers is the Court’s rel-
atively recent opinion in United States v. Bestfoods,127 which answered a 
question concerning a parent company’s liability under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA)128 for a subsidiary’s actions.129 CERCLA contains a provision 
permitting the U.S. to seek indemnification for the costs associated with 
chemical clean-up from “any person who at the time of disposal of any haz-
ardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
substances were disposed of.”130 The government brought this action against 
a number of parent companies and their subsidiaries,131 which had owned 
and operated the Michigan facility at issue in the case, in an attempt to offset 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s multi-million dollar clean-up initia-
tive there.132 
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Souter, held that 
derivative liability133 for a subsidiary company’s actions can only attach 
 
 125. Anderson, 321 U.S. at 362. Importantly, however, the Court simply stated that fraud 
was a sufficient, though not necessary, reason for dispensing with the corporate form. See id. 
(“The cases of fraud make up part of that exception . . . [, b]ut they do not exhaust it.”). 
 126. Id. at 362–63. All three of these have become factors considered by modern courts. 
See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 127. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2014). 
 129. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 
 131. Briefly, the chain of corporate decent is as follows. The contamination began around 
1957 under Ott Chemical Company’s (“Ott I”) ownership of the plant at issue. Bestfoods, 524 
U.S. at 56 n.3. Eight years later, CPC International Inc. (CPC) formed Ott Chemical Compa-
ny (“Ott II”) as its wholly owned subsidiary and purchased Ott I with CPC stock; after this 
merger, many of Ott I’s officers and directors stayed on with Ott II and also took positions 
with CPC. Id. at 56–57. Story Chemical Company (“Story”) purchased Ott II in 1972, but 
Story later went bankrupt in 1977. Id. at 57. After the finality of Story’s bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) discovered the extent of the 
contamination of the facility and sought a purchaser to mitigate the cost of the clean-up. Id. 
Aerojet-General Corp. responded to MDNR and formed a wholly-owned subsidiary, Cordova 
Chemical Company of California (“Cordova CA”), to purchase the facility from the bank-
ruptcy trustee. Id. Cordova CA then incorporated Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan 
as its wholly owned subsidiary to operate the facility. Id. at 56–57. Prior to the beginning of 
these proceedings, CPC assumed operations under the name Bestfoods. Id. at 56 n.3. 
 132. Id. at 57–58. 
 133. Derivative liability is “[l]iability for a wrong that a person other than the one 
wronged has a right to redress.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (9th ed. 2009). In the context 
of corporate law, piercing the corporate veil results in derivative liability because, in so do-
ing, a plaintiff is seeking to hold one corporation liable for the acts of another. See, e.g., Sid-
ney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1994). Direct 
260 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
where the corporate veil may be pierced; otherwise, “a corporate parent that 
actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the 
facility itself may be held directly liable [under CERCLA] in its own right 
as an operator of the facility.”134 In so doing, the Court reaffirmed its stance 
on both the principles of limited liability and piercing the corporate veil, and 
it further clarified the requisite, as opposed to normal, amounts of control 
exercised by a parent over its subsidiary needed to create derivative liabil-
ity.135 “[I]t is hornbook law,” the Court said, “that the exercise of the ‘con-
trol’ which stock ownership gives to the stockholders will not create liability 
beyond the assets of the subsidiary.”136 However, “if the corporate form 
would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most 
notably fraud, on the shareholder’s [or subsidiary’s] behalf,” then the veil 
may be pierced and the parent or shareholder may be held liable.137 
Finally, the Court also discussed the ramifications, or lack thereof, of 
the same individuals working for both a parent corporation and its subsidi-
ary.138 Adopting language from several circuits, the court opined, “it is en-
tirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to serve as directors 
of its subsidiary, and that fact alone may not serve to expose the parent cor-
poration to liability for its subsidiary’s acts.”139 Furthermore, “directors and 
officers holding positions with a parent and its subsidiary can and do 
‘change hats’ to represent the two corporations separately, despite their 
common ownership.”140 The Court then reiterated the presumption that indi-
viduals are acting on behalf of whichever entity whose hat they are currently 
wearing and mentioned that “it cannot be enough to establish liability here 
that dual officers and directors made policy decisions and supervised activi-
ties at the facility.”141 
Thus, to return to the earlier-posed hypotheticals,142 a parent company’s 
reasons for incorporating a subsidiary are almost irrelevant when consider-
ing either jurisdiction or liability. If German company A incorporated B in 
 
liability, on the other hand, results when “the parent is directly a participant in the wrong 
complained of.” William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through 
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 208 (1929). Because CERCLA, by its own 
terms, provides for the liability of owners and/or operators of facilities, it imposes direct 
liability on these actors when certain conditions are present. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 65. 
 134. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55. 
 135. Id. at 61–62. 
 136. Id. (citation and alterations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 62. 
 138. Id. at 69. 
 139. Id. (quoting American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 140. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 69 (quoting Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 
779 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 141. Id. at 69–70. 
 142. See introduction to Part II.C. 
2016] JURISDICTIONAL VEIL PIERCING 261 
Delaware and used B as its sole distributor in the United States, Daimler 
instructs that B would most certainly be subject to general jurisdiction in 
Delaware, its state of incorporation. To establish jurisdiction over A, howev-
er, a plaintiff would be required to show that A itself has sufficient contacts 
in a given jurisdiction. Although incorporating B counts as a contact, this 
action is not dispositive in determining jurisdiction over the foreign parent. 
Likewise, the principles of limited liability will shield A from liability in the 
United States for B’s actions. This shield will remain strong unless a plain-
tiff can successfully pierce the corporate veil between A and B. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Between its holding concerning the proper formulation of the general 
jurisdiction inquiry and its strong dicta related to jurisdictional veil piercing, 
Daimler has largely rendered unnecessary any inquiry into the various juris-
dictional veil-piercing tests. In attempting to establish general jurisdiction143 
over a parent corporation on the basis of its subsidiary’s contacts, the proper 
inquiry is now simply to assume the contacts of the subsidiary are attributa-
ble to the parent and to then analyze the parent’s total contacts with the fo-
rum. If the combined contacts are insufficient to establish general jurisdic-
tion over the parent under the newly-minted Daimler standards, then there is 
no reason to proceed with the confusing tests concerning jurisdictional veil 
piercing. Only if the combined contacts are sufficient to subject the parent to 
general jurisdiction in the chosen forum should a court apply the jurisdic-
tional veil-piercing tests. Finally, in the rare circumstance a court success-
fully establishes the first inquiry and progresses to the veil-piercing analysis, 
it is entirely unnecessary for a court to demand a finding of fraud or injus-
tice when considering the issue of jurisdictional veil piercing. 
A. Keep It Simple 
Personal jurisdiction is one of the most basic and fundamental concepts 
in the legal world;144 as such, all courts must have a keen understanding of 
the doctrine and its intricacies.145 Thus, courts and litigants can largely avoid 
 
 143. The focal point of this argument is general jurisdiction because, in the application of 
specific jurisdiction, only the substantive liability veil-piercing analysis will be relevant in the 
majority of suits. If the parent’s action or inaction directly injures a plaintiff, that plaintiff is 
generally free to file suit against the parent wherever that harm occurred. If a subsidiary cor-
poration’s actions cause the injury complained of, and the injured party sues the subsidiary 
directly to recover, the plaintiff, to recover from the parent based on the subsidiary’s actions, 
must then establish the requirements traditionally articulated to pierce the veil. 
 144. This is not to say the doctrine is not without its own set of baffling issues. 
 145. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990). 
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the confusion that runs rampant when applying the various tests for jurisdic-
tional veil piercing simply by assuming imputation and dealing with the 
personal jurisdiction issue first. This section will focus primarily on the cur-
rent state of bewilderment surrounding jurisdictional veil piercing and will 
then propose a modest solution to the problem, using the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Daimler to illustrate. 
1. The Problem with Jurisdictional Veil Piercing 
Despite variance from court to court in the names given to, and factors 
included in, a particular court’s approach, all of the jurisdictional veil-
piercing tests share several commonalities. For example, the primary two 
approaches—agency and alter-ego—are both fundamentally concerned with 
the amount of interconnectedness between a parent and its subsidiary and 
whether the parent exerts an overly substantial amount of control over the 
subsidiary.146 The requisite amount of control to pierce the corporate veil in 
this context is so substantial that the parent and subsidiary must be, for all 
practical purposes, the same entity.147 The similarities between the ap-
proaches seem to have led the courts to haphazardly use words in perform-
ing their analyses without considering any legal significance subscribed 
thereto, and this has created an abyss of diverging approaches without much 
genuine substantive distinction. 
Consider the evolution of the Cannon doctrine,148 which led to the de-
velopment of both the “agency” and “alter-ego” jurisdictional doctrines.149 
 
 146. See Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., CIV.A. 3746-VCP, 2008 WL 2737409, at *10 
n.76 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008) (“These two methods for establishing jurisdiction involve 
showing either that the absent parent instigated the subsidiary’s local activities or that the 
absent parent and the subsidiary are in fact a single legal entity.”). In so many words, the 
courts generally seem to require, in the agency analysis, so much from the parent in examin-
ing whether it “instigated the subsidiary’s local activities” that the parent, rather than the 
subsidiary, is actually performing the activities. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2014); see also William A. Voxman, Jurisdic-
tion over a Parent Corporation in Its Subsidiary’s State of Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
327, 340 (1992) (discussing the similarities between the two approaches despite the names 
given thereto). 
 147. Compare F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 130 Cal. App. 4th 782, 796 
(2005) (“To invoke alter ego, two conditions must be met: 1) there must be such a unity of 
interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist; and 2) there must 
be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.”), 
with In re Chinese Drywall, 753 F.3d at 531 (“[T]he parent corporation, to be liable for its 
subsidiary’s acts under the . . . agency theory, must exercise control to the extent the subsidi-
ary manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the 
purposes of the dominant corporation.”). 
 148. See supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
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Although it is certainly not unusual for a Supreme Court case to lead to di-
vergent approaches in varying circuits, the amount or degree of actual di-
vergence in these two theories is little more than nominal. In Mylan Labora-
tories,150 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the following fac-
tors in its application of the agency151 test: “whether significant decisions of 
the subsidiary must be approved by the parent”;152 whether the two compa-
nies maintain separate records and accounting procedures; whether the com-
panies conduct separate directors’ meetings; and the degree of interdepend-
ence between the companies, which requires the subsidiary company to 
“have some independent reason for its existence.”153 
When compared to a representative Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals al-
ter-ego analysis, the similarities between the two tests are obvious.154 Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, the alter-ego approach allows the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation if that parent 
“exerts such domination and control over its subsidiary ‘that they do not in 
reality constitute separate and distinct corporate entities but are one and the 
same corporation for purposes of jurisdiction.’”155 After its discussion of 
Cannon, the court then presented the following factors as relevant to the 
determination: the amount of stock ownership the parent holds in the subsid-
iary; whether the parent exerts control over the internal business affairs of 
the subsidiary; and other “relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the 
operations of the parent and subsidiary.”156 In this final catch-all category, 
the court’s analysis focused on the presence or absence of common corpo-
rate officers between the companies, whether corporate formalities were 
observed, and whether the companies maintained separate accounting sys-
tems and records.157 
Thus, regardless of the name given to the approach, both tests share the 
same origin in Cannon, the same objective to determine the degree of con-
 
 149. Compare Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
Cannon in the development of the agency test), with Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 
F.3d 642, 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing Cannon’s influence on the alter-ego test). 
 150. Mylan Labs., Inc., 2 F.3d at 61. 
 151. This test, according to the court, should be used “in deciding whether to pierce the 
veil separating parent corporations from their subsidiaries,” and it “allows the court to attrib-
ute the actions of a subsidiary . . . to the foreign parent corporation only if the parent exerts 
considerable control over the activities of the subsidiary.” Id. 
 152. This is the central factor. Id. 
 153. Id. (quoting Harris v. Arlen Props., Inc., 260 A.2d 22, 29 (Md. 1969)). 
 154. Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1160. 
 157. Id. 
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trol exercised by the parent over its subsidiary, and many of the same fac-
tors.158 As Professor Stephen Presser recently noted: 
We should be wary of the creation of doctrinal approaches, involving 
picturesque terms such as “mere instrumentality,” “business conduit,” 
“single business enterprise,” or “alter ego,” and their attendant lengthy 
check-off lists, which might obscure the purposes of the doctrine of lim-
ited liability. It would be wiser for judges to understand all of these doc-
trinal approaches as involving the same issues as the classical “piercing 
the corporate veil” doctrine.
159
 
Along these same lines, consider the factual data Peter Oh uncovered in 
his empirical study on veil piercing.160 Professor Oh found thirty-two factors 
commonly used by the courts to justify piercing the corporate veil. The five 
most popular reasons—fraud, misrepresentation, injustice, unfairness, and 
domination—are less than surprising;161 however, that cases reveal such a 
laundry list of vague terms brings truth to the earlier warning that veil pierc-
ing has turned into “jurisprudence by metaphor.”162 Professor Oh concluded 
that “a simple tally of factors appearing in decisions may provide an optical 
illusion, rather than an accurate portrait, of the reasons why veil-piercing 
succeeds.”163 Therefore, in an effort to promote what they view as equitable 
 
 158. For a circuit-by-circuit breakdown of agency and alter-ego jurisdictions, see supra 
notes 68 and 71, respectively. 
 159. Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter 
Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Lia-
bility: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 405, 428 (2006). 
 160. Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 133 (2010). Oh’s objective was to 
build upon Richard Thompson’s landmark 1991 study, see Thompson, supra note 4, by test-
ing Thompson’s methodology and clarifying the dataset to specifically account for claims of 
fraud or misrepresentation. Oh, supra, at 85–90. Importantly, Oh’s work apparently uses the 
traditional definition of “piercing the corporate veil,” and it is thus centered on affixing liabil-
ity to one party based on the acts of another. See id. at 106 (“As a preliminary matter, veil-
piercing is a remedial instrument for satisfying a judgment that stands apart from a matter’s 
substantive cause(s) of action.”). His specific accounting for fraud, however, allows the data 
to apply in the jurisdictional context since the presence of fraud or injustice is nearly the only 
factor differentiating the jurisdictional alter-ego test from the liability approach. 
 161. Oh, supra note 160, at 134. 
 162. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN 
THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983) [hereinafter PROCEDURAL 
PROBLEMS]. 
 163. Oh, supra note 160, at 133; see also PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE 
GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 107 (1987) (“There are two basic problems. 
First, the standards employed are conclusory and the metaphors do not provide a useful basis 
for decision of a particular case. Second, . . . [c]ourts applying ‘piercing the veil jurispru-
dence’ frequently rely on ‘piercing the veil’ decisions arising in very different areas of law.”); 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding 
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outcomes, the courts seem merely to be grasping at straws to select whatever 
factors fit into the facts presented; this approach does little more than breed 
uncertainty for other courts and business planners alike.164 
2. Daimler’s Implied Solution 
The most efficient course of action when faced with a jurisdictional 
veil-piercing issue is first to assume the subsidiary’s contacts in a forum can 
be imputed to the parent and second to assess the parent’s total contacts with 
the forum. Rather than launching into a full-blown analysis of the Ninth 
Circuit’s various jurisdictional veil-piercing tests, the Daimler Court simply 
skirted the issue noting the following: 
Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and 
further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there 
would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in Cali-




These assumptions enabled the Court to focus the remainder of its 
opinion on personal jurisdiction and to decide the case on the due process 
concerns associated therewith.166 In so doing, the Court was able to answer 
the easier question and avoid resolution of the harder issue,167 while also 
creating, knowingly or unknowingly, a new framework for the analysis of 
jurisdictional veil-piercing questions. 
As described above,168 the traditional course of action—regardless of 
the particular jurisdiction—when dealing with this issue has been to first 
conduct a searching analysis of the factors necessary to impute a subsidiary 
 
the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 855 (1997) (“At best, such 
terms are unhelpful. All too often, they confuse the issue.”). 
 164. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 162, at 8. 
 165. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). The Court was presumably able 
to make these assumptions based on a number of the Ninth Circuit’s findings that the parties 
either agreed on or failed to contest. Id. at 758. The primary question the Court sought to 
answer in this section of the opinion was whether Daimler’s contacts with the State of Cali-
fornia rendered the parent sufficiently “at home” to be subject to general jurisdiction in that 
state. Id. Because Daimler did not object to the lower court’s finding that MBUSA was sub-
ject to general jurisdiction in California, the Court just took this as given and moved on. Id. 
 166. Id. at 762. 
 167. See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1069.4 (3d ed. 1998); Suzanna Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme 
Court Should Duck the Issue in Daimlerchrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111, 
114 (2013). However, an examination of MBUSA’s contacts in California would have argua-
bly left open the bigger question of Daimler’s contacts therein, though possibly making that 
question easier to answer in the end. 
 168. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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company’s contacts in a forum to its parent, and this analysis has created 
mass uncertainty throughout veil-piercing jurisprudence. The fact-intensive 
nature of the jurisdictional veil-piercing inquiry makes it a tedious and time- 
consuming endeavor.169 After Daimler, however, courts would be wise to 
answer the jurisdiction question first because the court need not address the 
veil-piercing issue unless the parent and subsidiary have contacts that, when 
combined, establish a sufficient basis upon which to exercise jurisdiction 
over the parent.170 Thus, Daimler may have further called into question the 
validity of the Cannon doctrine.171 Likewise, to the extent that courts in the 
past considered jurisdictional veil piercing to be, more or less, the only step 
in asserting general jurisdiction over a parent corporation,172 Daimler makes 
clear that the parent must also have contacts sufficient to support the exer-
cise of general jurisdiction.173 
 
 169. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 167, at § 1069.4. 
 170. Additionally, it seems clear that neither the veil-piercing issue nor the jurisdiction 
question need be addressed at length if the chosen forum is the parent’s state of incorporation 
or principle place of business because “[t]hese bases afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one 
clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.” 
Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
 171. See PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 162, at 47 (arguing that Cannon’s continu-
ing validity is seriously questionable); Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdic-
tion and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 28–29 (1986) (collecting cases and providing possible explanations for various 
courts’ departure from Cannon). But see Swain & Aguilar, supra note 3, at 483 (“The central 
conclusion of this article is that the Cannon doctrine is as strong a precedent today as it was 
the day after it was decided.”). 
 172. See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 565 
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (“A court may acquire general jurisdiction over a defendant under two alter-
native theories. First, a court may obtain jurisdiction over any defendant that exhibits system-
atic and continuous contacts with the forum. Second, a court, already imbued with general 
jurisdiction over a corporation, may obtain jurisdiction over an affiliated entity when the two 
companies have fully integrated their operations and function as a single, unified entity.”). 
 173. See GoldenTree Asset Mgt. LP v. BNP Paribas S.A., 13 C 00435, 2014 WL 
4100445, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2014) (“In focusing on the forum contacts of the Illinois 
subsidiaries, GoldenTree misses the entire point of the Court’s decision in Daimler: general 
jurisdiction over the parent corporation must be predicated on an analysis of whether the 
parent corporation’s affiliations with the forum state as so systematic and continuous as to 
make the parent—not the subsidiaries—at home in the forum state.”). Cf. In re Chinese-
Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Daimler 
therefore embraces the significance of a principal-agent relationship to the specific-
jurisdiction analysis, though it suggests that an agency relationship alone may not be disposi-
tive.”). 
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3. The Irrelevance of Fraud or Injustice in Jurisdictional Veil Pierc-
ing 
In the rare circumstance a court finds a parent company is subject to 
general jurisdiction in a particular forum based on the assumed imputation 
of its subsidiary’s contacts in that forum, a court must then discern whether 
imputation was proper by applying one of the jurisdictional veil-piercing 
tests. As described above, the differences in the tests are more nominal than 
substantive,174 and this is even more so after the Court’s recognition of the 
issues accompanying the Second and Ninth Circuits’ “sufficiently important 
test.”175 The primary difference between the main two jurisdictional veil-
piercing tests—agency and alter-ego—is the necessity imposed in some 
jurisdictions that a finding of alter-ego requires the parent company to have 
committed an abuse of the corporate form.176 While this requirement is logi-
cally imposed when assessing vicarious liability, in the context of assessing 
jurisdiction over a person or entity, what matters—or what should matter—
is the extent of that person or entity’s contacts in the forum.177 
Since its inception, traditional veil-piercing analysis has, for the most 
part, required some showing of fraud or injustice to hold a parent corpora-
tion vicariously liable for its subsidiary’s debts.178 The common thread run-
ning through many of the cases that impose vicarious liability is some sort 
of deception or abuse by the entity creating the subsidiary and voluntary or 
involuntary third parties.179 In this context, the fraud or injustice element is 
logical because the privilege of conducting business as an incorporated enti-
ty has been abused.180 In the case of voluntary contractual creditors, the in-
jured third parties are deceived as to the true identity of the company with 
which they are dealing;181 on the other hand, involuntary tort creditors seek 
to enforce an unsatisfied judgment against an affiliated entity for the 
 
 174. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 175. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60; Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding 
A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 176. See FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 43.70 (discussing the differences between the 
jurisdictions that require a finding of fraud or injustice and those that do not). 
 177. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984). 
 178. See FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 43 (“[G]enerally, absent fraud or bad faith, a 
corporation will not be held liable for the acts of its subsidiaries or other affiliated corpora-
tions.”). 
 179. See Presser, supra note 159, at 412–13. 
 180. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 
155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
 181. See, e.g., Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce 
Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490, 497 (1918); Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1238 (1st Cir. 1996); Unit-
ed States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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“wrong” of inadequately capitalizing the subsidiary.182 Thus, in these in-
stances, the courts will not allow a parent company to take advantage of the 
privilege of limited liability as a result of the parent’s malfeasance.183 
However, many of these arguments completely erode when placed in 
the context of determining the extent of a given court’s jurisdiction over an 
affiliated entity. Given that the hallmark of personal jurisdiction is action 
within a forum,184 and this action can be performed directly by an actor or 
indirectly at the bequest of a principal,185 there is simply no justification for 
imposing a semi-substantive element, such as fraud, on an otherwise proce-
dural question.186 When determining jurisdiction, “a court properly focuses 
on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”187 
Although an inquiry into fraud or injustice may be appropriate in assessing 
specific jurisdiction when that fraud constitutes the contact on which juris-
diction is predicated,188 what matters when assessing general jurisdiction is 
the extent to which a “corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “con-
tinuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum 
State.’”189 It goes without saying that being “at home” in a state does not 
require the commission of a fraud. 
 
 182. See Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Commercial Cas. Consultants, Inc., 976 F.2d 272, 
276 (5th Cir. 1992); Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980); 
Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Ark. 1951); see also Unit-
ed States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998). 
 183. See Cohen, supra note 124, at 458. 
 184. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952) (“Whether due 
process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation 
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process 
clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment 
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no con-
tacts, ties, or relations.”). 
 185. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
 186. Cf. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, supra note 162, at 71–72 (noting that there is often a 
mismatch between the reasons articulated by courts in support of jurisdictional veil piercing 
and the underlying substantive causes of action). 
 187. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 
204 (1977)). 
 188. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 
(2011) (“Adjudicatory authority is ‘specific’ when the suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 n.13 
(2014) (“Agency relationships, we have recognized, may be relevant to the existence of spe-
cific jurisdiction.”). 
 189. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Daimler largely alleviated any practical utility served by the current 
tests for jurisdictional veil piercing in the context of general jurisdiction. 
Through the Court’s clarification that a corporation is, more often than not, 
only subject to general jurisdiction in its state of incorporation and principal 
place of business,190 and through the form of its analysis,191 the Court pro-
vided a new framework for the analysis of jurisdictional veil-piercing issues. 
When attempting to establish general jurisdiction over a parent corpo-
ration on the basis of its subsidiary’s contacts, lower courts should first as-
sume that the subsidiary’s contacts can be imputed to the parent and analyze 
whether those combined contacts are sufficient to subject the parent to gen-
eral jurisdiction. If the answer to this inquiry is “no,” there is simply no need 
to conduct any permutation of the jurisdictional veil-piercing tests because 
the exercise of jurisdiction would offend constitutional due process consid-
erations. 
On the other hand, if a court answers “yes” to this question, only then 
should a court analyze whether the subsidiary’s contacts can properly be 
imputed to the parent. In contrast to the context of piercing the corporate 
veil to hold a parent substantively liable for the debts or actions of a subsidi-
ary, the addition of a fraud or injustice requirement is completely unneces-
sary in performing a jurisdictional veil-piercing analysis. Thus, the proper 
formulation of this second step simply asks whether a subsidiary corporation 
“is an alter ego or successor of a corporation that would be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in that court.”192 
The impact of these changes, if followed, would present a substantial 
clarification to the laws surrounding jurisdictional and traditional veil pierc-
ing, and a clarification is desperately needed given the current state of disre-
pair in the jurisprudence on these issues. Not only would this change go a 
long way toward providing a clearer picture of the law, but it also would not 
be a difficult thing for courts to implement because they already perform 
both steps. The courts can dismiss a majority of cases simply by inverting 
the order in which these steps are performed. 
 
 
 190. See id. at 761 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, . 
. . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or princi-
pal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation 
at home in that State.”) (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 760. 
 192. See, e.g., Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
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